Abstract. We construct the rst public-key encryption scheme that is proven secure (in the standard model, under standard assumptions) even when the attacker gets access to encryptions of arbitrary ecient functions of the secret key. Specically, under either the DDH or LWE assumption, and for arbitrary but xed polynomials L and N , we obtain a public-key encryption scheme that resists key-dependent message (KDM) attacks for up to N (k) public keys and functions of circuit size up to L(k), where k denotes the size of the secret key. We call such a scheme bounded KDM secure. Moreover, we show that our scheme suces for one of the important applications of KDM security: ability to securely instantiate symbolic protocols with axiomatic proofs of security.
Introduction
An encryption scheme is key-dependent message (KDM) secure if it is secure even against an attacker who has access to encryptions of messages that depend on the secret key. This strong notion of security, introduced by Black et al. secret key and the encrypted messages. At a rst glance, it may seem that such correlations only arise from bugs or errors on part of the protocol designer, and hence achieving such a strong security is not of much importance. It turns out,
however, that such attacks naturally occur when considering complex systems.
For example, in some popular disk encryption utilities, the disk encryption key can end up being stored in the page le, and thus is encrypted along with the disk content [7] . In addition, Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [9] showed that schemes with a certain restricted form of KDM security known as circular security are useful for constructing Anonymous Credential Systems. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, KDM security naturally arises as the right notion when one wishes to securely instantiate symbolic protocols with an axiomatic proof of formal security (see Section 6) .
For a while, building a KDM-secure encryption scheme in the standard model, under any well studied hardness assumption, seemed too hard a nut to crack.
The only scheme that was shown to resist any kind of KDM attacks was given by Black et al. [6] in the random-oracle model. Yet, in recent years KDM-secure encryption schemes were given for some non-trivial families of functions. This line of work started with the works of Halevi and Krawczyk [18] and Hofheinz and Unruh [19] , who gave private-key encryption schemes secure against signicantly restricted classes of KDM queries. Concretely, [18] prove security against arbitrary but xed KDM queries that are known in advance, and against KDM queries that do not depend on certain protected parts of the key. The constructions from [19] obtain statistical KDM security in the presence of suciently few (arbitrary) KDM queries, as well as a stateful KDM-secure scheme in which KDM queries may only depend on the current state (but not on previous states).
A major step was taken by Boneh, Halevi, Hamburg, and Ostrovsky [7] who presented, under the decisional Die-Hellman (DDH) assumption, a public-key encryption scheme that is N (k)-circular secure for every polynomial N , and in fact is secure against the more general family of attacks allowing the adversary access to encryptions of arbitrary ane functions of the vector of N (k) secret keys. Applebaum, Cash, Peikert, and Sahai [3] presented more ecient schemes that are secure against a similar family of key-dependent attacks, whose security is based on dierent assumptions: the learning parity with noise (LPN) assumption in the secret-key case and the learning with errors (LWE) assumption in the public-key case. In a recent independent work, Brakerski, Goldwasser, and
Kalai [8] presented a transformation from a KDM secure scheme satisfying a certain property (in particular satised by the DDH and LWE based schemes of [7, 3] ) into a scheme that is KDM secure with respect to a larger class of functions. While their transformation cannot be used to achieve security against all circuits of size p(n), it has the benet of depending only on the number of functions in the class, and being independent of their circuit size or number of keys. In particular they achieve KDM security with respect to the class of constant degree polynomials and any polynomial number of keys.
Despite the above progress, the families of functions for which KDM security was achieved prior to our work (in the standard model, under standard assumptions) was still quite restricted. In particular, these families were not suciently rich for several of the applications of KDM security in the context of complex systems and formal protocols. A partial explanation for this rather limited success was recently given by Haitner and Holenstein [17] , who showed the impossibility of obtaining KDM security based on standard assumptions and using standard techniques. (In Section 1.2, we will describe their results in more detail, since we will later extend them to our case of bounded KDM security.)
Our Results
Our main result is the following:
Theorem 1 (Informal). Under the DDH or LWE assumption, for any given polynomials L = L(k) and N = N (k), there exists a public-key encryption scheme that is KDM-secure with respect to the class of circuits of size L(k), and for N (k) independent keys, where k denotes the size of the keys.
We call such a scheme a bounded KDM-secure encryption scheme. (This is in contrast with a fully -or unbounded -KDM scheme, where the circuit size and the number of keys can be an arbitrarily large polynomial in the security parameter, independent of the scheme's complexity.) We argue that this is the rst encryption scheme (under standard cryptographic assumptions) that handles a rich enough function class to capture most real life KDM attacks.
The original motivation for KDM security was to securely instantiate symbolic cryptographic protocols that have a formal proof of security in some axiomatic system. As further evidence for the usefulness of bounded KDM security, we show that our notion is strong enough for this application:
Theorem 2 (Informal). Let P be a symbolic protocol with operations such as public-key encryption and digital signatures. Then, instantiating P with a bounded KDM-secure 5 encryption scheme provides a computationally sound implementation.
This yields the rst soundness result without restrictions (such as assuming protocols without key-cyclic expressions) in the standard model.
Finally, we show that the above positive results are tight, by extending an impossibility result of Haitner and Holenstein [17] in the following sense:
Theorem 3 (Informal). An encryption scheme cannot be proven to be KDMsecure against a family of functions that contains exponentially hard pseudorandom functions, if the proof of security only accesses the query function and the adversary attacking the scheme in a black-box manner (i.e., as oracles).
Remarks. We note the following points about our result:
5 Actually, the precise notion we use is length-dependent KDM security (see Denition 5). This is a slight strengthening of bounded KDM security, and our scheme satises this stronger notion as well. is false (assuming we instantiate our scheme from the DDH assumption),
or that h has no circuit of size k 3 . Hence, a proof that this construction is insecure against a polynomial-time KDM attacker will provably demonstrate than either DDH is false, or that P ⊆ Size(k 2 ) (we lose a factor of k because h has a k-bit output). The latter is a widely believed fact, but its proof would be considered a major breakthrough in complexity theory.
(Also, it is not at all clear how to derive such a conclusion directly from the DDH assumption typically in cryptography we need to use subexponential hardness assumptions to get such a condition.) More generally, a successful attack is some way to certify that h is hard even though it is easy in time k 3 to generate a random function outside of Size(k 2 ), it is not at all clear how to generate such a function along with a publicly veriable certicate of hardness.
3. Black-box-ness. Our scheme makes a non-black-box use of the KDM function h, where Theorem 3 shows that this use is inherent.
Applications to formal security. A central motivation for the study of KDM security lies in the connection between formal and computational cryptography.
In formal cryptography (starting with [12, 13, 23] ), cryptographic operations like encryption or digital signatures are abstracted as symbolic operators that (only)
adhere to natural rules. Given such rules, a simple calculus enables machineassisted security analysis.
It was proven by Adão et al. [2] that fully KDM-secure encryption schemes imply computational soundness for arbitrary symbolic protocols. We reconsider their proof and show (Theorem 9) that bounded KDM security of the type that we achieve suces. Hence, our combined results give the rst encryption scheme (under standard cryptographic assumptions) whose security implication can be veried using formal security methods.
We stress that the clique security achieved by [7, 3] only enables to apply these formal methods to a very limited class of applications. For more details see Section 6.
Our Techniques
We now give an informal overview of the proof of Theorem 1. The following exposition focuses on a scheme that is secure against a single-key KDM attack.
That is, there is only one public/private key pair (pk , sk ) of length k, and the attacker can obtain encryptions of messages of the form h(sk ) for an arbitrary function h of circuit complexity at most L(k). (Here L = L(k) is an arbitrary xed polynomial which aects the complexity of the encryption and decryption, but not the complexity of key generation.) The multiple-key case raises some additional subtleties that we ignore for the moment.
Recall that a homomorphic public-key encryption scheme is a public-key encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) that also has an additional algorithm Eval for evaluating functions on an encrypted message. Concretely, Eval takes the public key pk , an encryption of a message M , and a description of a function h from some family H, and outputs a string from which h(M ) can be eciently decrypted using the secret key sk . Our starting point is the following observation:
a suciently strong homomorphic encryption is in fact also KDM-secure (with respect to the same class of functions H), where suciently strong means that the scheme satises the following additional properties:
1. Self-referential (i.e., 1-circular) security: Enc pk (sk ) is indistinguishable from Enc pk (0 k ).
2. Strong function privacy: For every h ∈ H and plaintext M , Eval pk (h, Enc pk (M )) is indistinguishable from Enc pk (h(M )), even against a distinguisher that knows the secret key.
The basic idea for proving the KDM-security of such a scheme is that a distinguisher between Enc pk (h(sk )) and Enc pk (h(0 k )) can be used to distinguish between Enc pk (sk ) and Enc pk (0 k ) by simply running Eval with the function h (and thus the KDM queries are useless). When turning this idea into a proof one sees that it is crucial that function privacy hold even with respect to a distinguisher that knows the secret key.
This observation already implies that Gentry's recent breakthrough fully homomorphic encryption scheme [15] is fully KDM-secure, assuming that it is circular-secure (an assumption which is anyway necessary in Gentry's case to get a truly fully homomorphic encryption, where the public key does not grow with the depth of the circuit).
6 Since all natural candidates for public-key encryption schemes are not known to be 1-circular insecure, we nd this observation interesting, as the assumption of circular security seems cleaner and more conservative than assuming full KDM security. (In particular, it is more easily falsiable in the sense of Naor [25] .)
In fact, it turns out that it suces to have only weak function privacy, requiring that Eval pk (h, Enc pk (M )) be indistinguishable from Eval pk (h , Enc pk (M )) for 6 As Gentry notes, if one assumes his scheme is circular-secure then it also enjoys strong statistical function privacy.
h, h , M such that h(M ) = h (M ) (again indistinguishability is with respect to attackers who know the secret key).
7 See Theorem 5 for the details.
The latter observation suggests an approach to get KDM security for circuits of size L under standard assumptions. Consider any two-message protocol for evaluating a universal function with security against semi-honest parties. Such a protocol takes an input M from a receiver and a circuit h from a sender, and delivers the output h(M ) to the receiver. Given any such protocol and a standard public-key encryption (PKE), one can construct a homomorphic scheme with weak function privacy as follows. The public key is the public key pk of the PKE. The encryption of M under pk is a triple (C, pk , C ) where C is an encryption of M under pk , pk is the receiver's rst message in the protocol on input M , and C is an encryption under pk of the secret randomness sk used to generate pk (which is needed to recover the output of the protocol). The algorithm Eval((C, pk , C ), h) returns the sender's response to pk on input h along with C . Given sk , the output of Eval can be used to decrypt h(M ) by rst recovering sk and then computing the receiver's output in the protocol.
The advantage of this approach is that it can be instantiated under standard assumptions by using Yao's protocol [28] . More concretely, a secure two-message protocol for the universal function can be obtained by combining Yao's garbled circuit construction and any two-message oblivious transfer (OT) [27, 14] protocol.
8 Unlike the alternative of using fully homomorphic encryption, however, this protocol has the caveat that the communication must grow with the size of h, and hence (weak) function privacy can only hold with respect to the class H of all circuits with some a-priori size bound L.
A more subtle problem is that of making the homomorphic scheme constructed in the above way circular-secure. Indeed, encrypting the secret key of the homomorphic scheme with its own public key results in a circular dependency between the underlying PKE and the two-message protocol: the secret key sk of the PKE is encrypted using the public key pk of the protocol, whereas the secret key sk of the protocol is encrypted using the public key pk of the PKE. Even if the PKE is circular-secure, it is not clear that this property will be respected by the above construction.
Our way to handle this diculty is by introducing a new notion that we call targeted encryption, which is aimed towards resolving the above dependency when applied to a two-message protocol based on Yao's technique. Targeted encryption can be viewed as a circular-secure extension of both public-key en-7 This is indeed a weaker notion since if
Intuitively, weak function privacy allows Eval to map ciphertexts from one domain to a dierent domain, while this is ruled out by strong function privacy.
8 Two-message OT is a protocol comprised of one message from the receiver and one message from the sender, where the receiver has an input selection bit s and the sender has a pair of input strings X0, X1. In the end of the protocol the receiver only learns Xs and the sender learns nothing about s. Here we need k parallel instances of OT, where the receiver has a k-bit input selection vector s and the sender has k pairs of strings.
cryption and two-message OT. Loosely speaking, one can think of this as an OT protocol where the receiver has no secret information apart from the input selection vector s. This may look strange at rst, and indeed it can be shown to be inherently at odds with the standard notion of OT, which requires that the sender learn nothing about s. But it turns out that one can obtain a meaningful relaxation of the above notion that is strong enough for our purposes. We then
show that both the schemes of Boneh et al. [7] and Applebaum et al. [3] can be used to construct targeted encryption. The key property we use is that both schemes enjoy KDM security against ane functions, and in fact this is proven by giving a public algorithm to compute an encryption of any ane function of the secret key. We show that such an algorithm implies targeted encryption.
As mentioned above, multiple-key security adds some additional diculties.
In particular, targeted encryption on its own does not seem sucient for multiple key security, and to handle this case we need to appeal to the multiple-key circular security of the underlying schemes.
To show our negative result (Theorem 3), we employ the techniques of Haitner and Holenstein [17] . Concretely, they showed that an encryption scheme cannot be proved to be KDM-secure against the family of all functions, if the proof of security only accesses the query function and the adversary attacking the scheme in a black-box manner (i.e., as oracles).
9 Here we extend this result to every family of functions that contains exponentially hard pseudorandom functions. There was no prior scheme that was shown (under a standard assumption)
to be secure with respect to such a family, although many of the applications of KDM security require that the KDM function can be a cryptographic primitive such as a signature, a hash function, etc.
Preliminaries
Notation. For n ∈ N, let [n] := {1, . . . , n}. Throughout the paper, k ∈ N denotes the security parameter. For a nite set X, we denote by x ← X the process of sampling x uniformly from X. For a probabilistic algorithm A, we denote by y ← A(x) the process of running A on input x and with uniform randomness, and assigning y the result. If A runs in time polynomial in the security parameter k, then A is a ppt machine. (We always assume that k can be eciently computed from the input to the algorithm even if it not explicitly given.) A func-
Encryption schemes. A public-key encryption (PKE) scheme with message space M = M k and secret key space K = K k , consists of three algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec) Key generation Gen(1 k ) outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk ∈ K k . Encryption Enc pk (M ) takes a public key pk and a message M ∈ M k , and outputs a ciphertext C . Decryption Dec sk (C ) takes a secret key sk and a ciphertext C , and outputs a message M . For correctness, we require Dec sk (C ) = M for all M ∈ M k , all (pk , sk ) in the range of Gen(1 k ), and all C in the range of Enc pk (M ). For simplicity, we will assume from now on that both the key space and the message space are {0, 1}
k . Our denitions and results, however, can be easily adapted to the case of messages of arbitrary length.
Garbled circuits
An essential building block of our KDM secure encryption scheme is Yao's garbled circuit construction, attributed to [28] . Informally, the variant of this construction on which we rely transforms any circuit h with k input bits along with k pairs of random keys (
such that the following properties hold:
For any input x ∈ {0, 1} k and any choice of 2k keys, the output h(x) can be eciently decoded (without knowing h) from GC and the k keys K i,xi corresponding to x.
GC together with the k keys corresponding to x computationally hide all information about h other than the size of h and h(x).
GC alone computationally hides all information about h other than its size, where the last two properties hold with respect to a random choice of the keys and a random execution of the transformation. The existence of a construction satisfying the above requirements is formally captured by the following theorem.
See the full version of this paper [5] for a derivation of this theorem from the literature.
Theorem 4 (Garbled circuits). Suppose that one-way functions exist. Then
there is a pair of polynomial-time randomized algorithms (Garble, GCEval) that for security/input parameter k, output parameter m, and circuit size parameter s satisfy the following:
and outputs a garbled circuit GC . GCEval takes an input x ∈ {0, 1} k , a k key tuple, and a garbled circuit GC and outputs y ∈ {0, 1} m .
Correctness. We require that if
10 For ease of notation we assume that the input x is included in the description of Kx. This is needed to guarantee correctness even when a pair of keys happen to be identical. Alternatively, we could avoid giving x as input to GCEval by either settling for statistical correctness or allowing the keys to be correlated. Security against receiver. For every polynomials s(k), m(k), every x ∈ {0, 1} k and every h, h :
Security against outsiders. For every polynomials s(k), m(k) and every
Key-dependent message security
Loosely speaking, the notion of key-dependent message (KDM) security gives an adversary access to encryptions of messages of the form h(sk ), where h : K → M is a function that the adversary can choose from some family. The formal denition below is taken from Black et al. [6] and allows the function to depend on some N = N (k) secret keys. While handling multiple keys is important for the application to formal cryptography (see Section 6), much of the technical challenge is already manifested in the case N = 1, and so the reader may wish to focus on this case initially.
Denition 1 (KDM security). Let PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a public-key encryption scheme with message space M and secret key space K. Let pk := (pk 1 , . . . , pk N ) and sk := (sk 1 , . . . , sk N ) be public, resp., secret key vectors, where Fake pk be the oracle that on input h, µ as above returns C ← Enc(pk µ , 0 k ). Examples of KDM function classes. The following examples of KDM function classes will be important for us.
Clique/circular security. Let S N consist of all functions h i : ({0, 1}
, where h i (sk 1 , . . . , sk N ) = sk i . Thus, KDM security with respect to S N allows the adversary to obtain encryptions Enc pk i (sk j )
for every i, j ∈ [N ]. This was called clique security by Boneh et al. [7] who gave a scheme that is KDM secure with respect to S N for every N that is polynomial in the security parameter. (See Applebaum et al. [3] for another construction.) Security with respect to S N implies N -circular security. This notion, dened by [9] states that for independently generated N key pairs (pk 1 , sk 1 ), . . . , (pk N , sk N ), the vector of N encryptions Enc pk 1 (sk 2 ), Enc pk 2 (sk 3 ), . . . ,
k that can be described with circuits of size at most L. We say that a scheme is (N, L) bounded KDM secure, if it is KDM secure with respect to C N (k),L(k) , where k denotes both the security parameter and the secret key size. 11
Full (unbounded) security. Full KDM security is equivalent to requiring that a scheme is KDM secure with respect to C N,L for every polynomials, in the security parameter, N and L. Note that this denition seems like the best one should look for, since a ppt adversary cannot generate circuits (i.e., queries) of superpolynomial size.
Finally, we say that a scheme has single-key KDM security, if in the KDM attack above the number of keys N is restricted to being 1. This notion makes sense with respect to bounded/unbounded security, where in the case of or clique or circular security it is equivalent to self reference security the adversary has access to Enc pk (sk).
KDM security from homomorphic encryption
In this section we observe that one can get KDM security from a certain kind of homomorphic encryption schemes.
Denition 2 (Homomorphic encryption). Let H = {H k } be a sequence of sets of Boolean circuits. A tuple of algorithms ξ = (Gen, Enc, Dec, Eval) is a homomorphic encryption scheme with respect to H, if (Gen, Enc, Dec) is a public key encryption scheme, and in addition for every (pk , sk
We say that ξ satises strong (statistical) function-privacy if for every h ∈ H k , pk in the range of Gen(1
We say that ξ satises weak (statistical) function-privacy if for every h, h ∈ H k , pk in the range of Gen(1
We say that a scheme is fully homomorphic if (1) (2) .
As mentioned in Section 1.2, we observe that a homomorphic encryption scheme with respect to a class H that is strongly function-private and is circular secure, is also KDM secure with respect to the same class. This already implies that Gentry's scheme is fully KDM secure under certain assumptions that do not refer to full KDM security (i.e., hardness of a certain bounded-distance decoding problem on ideal lattices, a sparse subset sum problem, and assuming the scheme is circular secure). Moreover, for this application we can relax the condition to weak function-privacy:
Theorem 5. Suppose that there is a homomorphic encryption scheme with respect to a class H that is weakly function private and 1-circular secure. Then there is a single-key KDM-secure scheme with respect to the same class H.
Proof Sketch Let (Gen, Enc, Dec, Eval) be the homomorphic encryption scheme. Our encryption scheme (Gen , Enc , Dec ) will be as follows:
Key Generation Gen (1 k ) runs (pk , sk ) ← Gen(1 k ) and outputs the same secret key sk and as public key the concatenation of pk and C = Enc pk (sk ).
Encryption Enc pk ,C (M ) outputs Eval pk (const M , C), where const M is the constant function that always outputs M .
Decryption We have Dec = Dec.
12 One can naturally dene computational versions of weak and strong function privacy, in which case one needs to allow the distinguisher to get the secret key as part of the input, and in some applications also the randomness used to generate this secret key.
13 The fully homomorphic version of Gentry's scheme requires three assumptions: hardness of a certain bounded-distance decoding problem on ideal lattices, hardness of a sparse version of subset sum, and circular security of his basic ideal-lattice based scheme.
Correctness follows easily from the homomorphic property. For security, consider a KDM attacker, that queries an oracle with h and gets back Enc pk ,C (h(sk )) = Eval pk (const h(sk ) , C). We proceed by a hybrid argument. Suppose that the oracle was changed so that it returned Eval pk (h, C). Since C is an encryption of sk , and obviously const h(sk ) (sk ) = h(sk ), and the scheme satises weak function-privacy this will not change the attacker's output distribution.
(Since we need the secret key to compute const h(sk ) , we will need here to use the fact that weak function-privacy holds even with respect to distinguishers that know the secret key.) The new oracle, however, can be simulated by the attacker on its own (since it does not use the secret key at all, but only h and C). Hence, we complete the proof by appealing to the circular security of the encryption, to argue that C might as well be an encryption of junk.
As a corollary, assuming the circular security of a version of Paillier's cryptosystem [26, 11] , the homomorphic PKE construction from [20] yields a KDMsecure encryption scheme with respect to the class of branching programs of a bounded (polynomial) length, but unbounded (polynomial) size. In other words, the length of the ciphertexts should only depend on the length of branching programs computing the KDM function but not on their size. Compared to the alternative based on the circular-secure version of Gentry's scheme, the conclusion is much weaker but the assumption is dierent (and seemingly more conservative).
Targeted Encryption
The main tool we use to realize our KDM secure scheme is a new notion we call targeted encryption. This is a variant of a public key encryption scheme that has the following curious property: the encryption algorithm gets, apart from the message x, two additional inputs: an index i ∈ [k] (where k is the bit length of the secret key), and a bit b. The decryption algorithm successfully retrieves x if the i th bit of the secret key is b, but otherwise gets no information about x. 14 
Denition 3 (Targeted encryption). An targeted encryption scheme TES
consists of a tuple of algorithms (TGen, TEnc, TDec) such that on security parameter k, TGen outputs a pair (pk , sk ) with sk = (sk 1 , . . . , sk k ) ∈ {0, 1} k and:
Targeted decryption For every message x ∈ {0, 1} n and index i ∈ [k],
I.e., it is possible for a sender, given (i, b), to encrypt a message x such that the following hold: if the i th bit of the secret key is b, then the receiver decrypts this message successfully.
14 We do not actually require a targeted encryption to also have a standard (untargeted) encryption algorithm, that always succeeds although this can easily be achieved by, say, concatenating two encryptions using parameters i, 0 and i, 1. Later, to achieve multiple-key security, we will need to assume such an algorithm with particular properties, see Section 5.
(Statistical) security against receiver For every x, x ∈ {0, 1} n and index
I.e., if the i th bit of the secret key is not b, then the receiver gets no information about the message x. 15 Security against outsiders For every x, x ∈ {0, 1} n , index i ∈ [k], and b ∈ {0, 1},
I.e., outsiders, who do not know the secret key, get no information about the encryption, even if the i th bit of sk does equal b.
The next theorem states that targeted encryption scheme can be obtained from either the DDH or the LWE assumptions.
Theorem 6. Suppose that (1) the DDH Assumption holds, or (2) the LWE assumption holds (with certain parameters),
16 then there exists a targeted encryption scheme.
Theorem 6 is proven by showing that targeted encryption is implied by both the work of Boneh et al. [7] and the work of Applebaum et al. [3] (see the full version [5] of this paperfor the formal proof ). The idea of the proof is as follows.
Both works give schemes that are KDM secure with respect to ane functions over Z k q for some number q, where k being the secret key size. Their proofs, 17
however, actually give the following stronger homomorphic property: there exists an algorithm Eval that gets the public key and an ane function h : Z k q → Z k q , and outputs an encryption of h(sk ) that is statistically indistinguishable from Enc pk (h(sk )). Note that this is a property that indeed immediately implies KDM security for ane functions. We will use this property to get the following targeted encryption scheme: to encrypt a message x ∈ {0, 1} n so that it can only be decrypted if the i th bit of the key is b, we view x as an element inside Z q (using some natural embedding for large enough q, where if n is too large, we encrypt x in chunks) and choose a random r ∈ Z q and use the encryption of scheme to encrypt r · (sk i − b) + x. Note that this is an ane function of sk , 18 and its value is independent of x if sk i = b, but is equal to x otherwise. Some complications arise from the fact that in [7] the group is actually given in the exponent, where in [3] the key is not a bit string, but rather a vector in Z k q .
Nevertheless, these issues can be easily handled in both cases.
15 For our purposes we can relax this notion to computational indistinguishability with respect to distinguishers that get the secret key as additional input. 16 The exact group for DDH and parameters for LWE are inherited from the assumptions [7, 3] ; one important note is that we need to assume LWE for a prime modulus that is polynomial in the security parameter.
17 In [7] 's case, the above is true for what they call their expanded scheme.
18 Indeed this is the function h(sk) = r, sk + x , where ri = r, rj = 0 for j = i, and
Discussion Targeted encryption and oblivious transfer. Recall that in a (one out of two) oblivious transfer (OT) protocol, a sender holds a pair of values (x 0 , x 1 ), and a receiver has a bit b. At the end of the protocol, the receiver learns x b and learns nothing about x 1−b , while the sender learns nothing about b. A two-message OT protocol is one that consists of only two messages the rst from the receiver and the second from the sender. It is easy to see that any two-message OT implies a public-key cryptosystem (with the rst message being the public key); in addition, almost all popular candidates for public-key cryptosystems imply two-message OT protocols.
A targeted encryption scheme can be thought of as a type of self-referential OT where the receiver's input selection bits are equal to the secret information it keeps after its rst message (i.e., the secret key). It does not satisfy, however, the standard notion of OT, since the sender is not guaranteed to learn nothing about this secret key (although the security against outsiders property does imply that the sender cannot recover it completely). We note that it is possible (though we do not need to use this fact in this paper) to transform an OT with such a guarantee into a full-edged OT, using the techniques of [16, 10] . 4 Our Bounded KDM Secure Construction
Let k be the security parameter. Let TES = (TGen, TEnc, TDec) be a targeted encryption scheme. We will construct the following PKE scheme bKDM = (Gen, Enc, Dec) that is parameterized over polynomials N and L.
Key generation. Gen(1 k ) samples and outputs (pk , sk ) ← TGen(1 k ). 
k and computes the value K i = TDec sk (K i,ski ) for every i ∈ [k]. Then, it outputs the result of evaluating the garbled circuit GC on K 1 , . . . , K k .
It is easily veried that the decryption will indeed output const M (sk ) = M .
We would like to emphasize that key generation does not depend on L or N , only encryption does. Hence, we can generate and distribute keys even without knowing L and N in advance.
Single-key security of the construction
We now show that bKDM is KDM secure for the case of a single key (i.e., N = 1). In Section 5, we show that if the underlying targeted encryption scheme is circular secure (when suitably interpreted as a PKE scheme), bKDM actually is secure for an arbitrary number of keys.
Theorem 7. If TES = (TGen, TEnc, TDec) is a targeted encryption scheme,
Proof Fix N = 1, an arbitrary L and a ppt adversary A on bKDM's bounded KDM security. In order to keep the notations simple, we concentrate on the single query case (i.e., the attacker only asks a single key related query). The multi query case, however, easily follows from the same lines. We proceed in games. Let X i be A's output in Game i, and write X i ≈ X j as a shorthand for Table 1 for an overview of all games used in the proof. In all the following games, (sk, pk) are chosen at random using TGen and the oracles get h :
Game 0 is the real KDM game. Namely, the oracle Real pk ,sk returns the ciphertext Enc pk (h(sk )). Recall that this is computed by (1) choosing a random 2k key tuple K, (2) encrypting the keys using TEnc to obtain a tuple of ciphertexts
In Game 1 the oracle setsK i,b to TEnc pk (0
(Note that we still use the original K in the garbled circuit construction.) Since GC is independent from the random coins used to encryptK , the security against receiver property of TES yields that X 0 ≈ X 1 .
In Game 2 the oracle uses h instead of const h(sk ) in the garbled circuit con-
and only the keys K sk = (K i,ski ) i are used outside the garbled circuit construction, the security against receiver of the garbled circuit construction yields that X 1 ≈ X 2 . We note that the only role of the secret key in this game, is for deciding which elements ofK are replaced by encryptions of 0 k .
In Game 3 we go back to using the originalK (also for the (i, b) with b = sk i ). Again, the security against receiver property of TES implies that X 2 ≈ X 3 . Note that in this game the encryption oracle does not use the secret key at all.
We dene Game 4 to be the variant of Game 3 in which we setK i,b = TEnc pk (0 k ) for every i, b (i.e., we ignore the value of K for this part). Since the secret key is never used in either Game 3 or Game 4, the security against outsiders property of the TES implies that X 3 ≈ X 4 . Note that in this game, the vector K is independent ofK .
In Game 5 we change h to const 0 k in the garbled circuit construction. Since no information on the key vector K, except for the garbled circuit itself, is given in both oracles, the security against outsiders property of the garbled circuit construction implies that X 4 ≈ X 5 . (Note that we need to use the security against outsiders and not the security against receiver property, since obviously we have no guarantee that h(sk ) = const
We dene Game 6 to be the game in which we go back to using the realK .
Since the oracles do not use the secret key, we get that X 5 ≈ X 6 . Observe that the encryption oracle is exactly the Fake oracle as per Denition 1, and hence we have completed the proof.
fake KDM game Table 1 . Overview of the games used in the proof of Theorem 7. We use boxes to highlight the component that changed from the previous hybrid, and note in the remark the justication for the fact that the hybrid is indistinguishable from the previous one.
Multiple Key Security
While the notion of KDM security for a single key is challenging and elegant, many of the applications actually require KDM security in the presence of arbitrarily (polynomially) many keys. Hence, let now the number of keys N be an arbitrary polynomial in the security parameter. We will prove that our scheme bKDM from Section 4 is (N, L)-bounded KDM secure, but now under an additional assumption, and with dierent parameters.
Complication and central idea. Recall the proof of Theorem 7. There, we have rst substituted the function const h(sk ) that is evaluated by GC by the KDM query function h itself. By the secrecy against receiver property of the garbled circuit, we could argue that this change goes unnoticed by the receiver. This modication was a crucial step in our proof, since it allowed to construct the garbled circuit without knowing sk . Recall that in multiple secret keys case, the security is dened with respect to N public and secret keys pairs ((pk 1 , sk 1 ), . . . , (pk N , sk N )), and the adversary gets encryptions of a query function h = h(sk ) under arbitrary pk µ for µ ∈ [N ]. Hence, we cannot simply substitute const h(sk ) with h directly (the secrecy against receiver property of the garbled circuit would not help in this case, since we cannot claim that
19 Instead, we will substitute const h(sk ) with a function h for which h (sk µ ) = h(sk ). This function h contains an encryption of sk under the receiver's public key pk µ . In this, we will have to interpret bKDM's underlying targeted encryption scheme TES as a circular-secure encryption scheme.
19 h(sk µ) is not even well dened; h is expecting a vector of (secret) keys as input, and not a single key.
(Circular security is required to guarantee that we can later replace these encryptions of secret keys with 0 k -encryptions.) Since our targeted encryption scheme instance is based on the clique-secure encryption schemes of [7, 3] , it already has this property. The remaining part of the proof follows the proof of Theorem 7.
Denition 4 (Augmented targeted encryption). An augmented targeted encryption scheme ATES = (TGen, TEnc, TDec, Enc, Dec) is a targeted encryption scheme (TGen, TEnc, TDec), complemented by ppt algorithms Enc, Dec for (un-targeted) encryption and decryption. We require that (TGen, Enc, Dec) is a public-key encryption scheme with message space M ⊆ {0, 1}
k . In particular,
We say that ATES is circular secure if (TGen, Enc, Dec) is. We stress that our both TES instances from Theorem 6 are circular secure augmented targeted encryption schemes with the natural encryption and decryption algorithms from Boneh et al. [7] and Applebaum et al. [3] respectively. The following theorem implies our main result (i.e., Theorem 1). We provide a proof in the full version A simple calculus like this enables machine-assisted security analysis (e.g., [21, 22] ). It is not a priori clear, however, that security properties proved in the symbolic calculus also hold for the computational implementation of the protocol.
Computational soundness. Abadi and Rogaway [1] were the rst to relate the formal and computational views on cryptography. Specically, they showed that every symbolically proven property also holds in the computational world, assuming a suitable computational implementation. This is usually referred to as a soundness result, and suitable computational implementations are dubbed sound. In order to provide computational soundness in this sense in face of a passive adversary, an encryption scheme essentially needs to be IND-CPA secure.
Key-cyclic expressions. There is a technical nuisance, however, that limits the generality and expressivity of [1] 's approach. Namely, the soundness result only holds for protocols that do not contain key-cyclic expressions. That is, only protocols in which no expressions with cyclic dependencies of encryption keys (such as E K1 (E K2 (K 1 ))) appear are considered. This is for the following reason:
in the symbolic setting, the natural deduction rules explicitly require secret keys for decryption. Hence, the encrypted plaintexts in such expressions are secret by denition in the symbolic world (i.e., there is no formal way to apply, say, Soundness from Bounded KDM Security. It was informally claimed by Black et al. [6] , and formally proven by Adão et al. [2] , that fully KDM-secure encryption schemes imply computational soundness for arbitrary symbolic protocols. Since we can only achieve bounded KDM security against arbitrary circuits up to a certain size, we ask whether bounded KDM security suces for computational soundness of arbitrary symbolic protocols. The answer we give is essentially armative.
To do so, we introduce the following slight strengthening of bounded KDM Theorem 9 (Following [1, 2] : Bounded KDM security implies soundness). Let bKDM be an N -key length-dependent KDM secure PKE scheme, and let P be a symbolic protocol with N parties in the setting of Adão et al. [2] . Then bKDM provides a computationally sound implementation of P .
We stress that the choice of symbolic setting [2] was made only for simplicity.
We provide a proof outline in the full version [5] of this paper.
Application of our results. Theorem 9 can be instantiated with our scheme bKDM from Section 4. (As argued above, bKDM actually is N -key lengthdependent bounded KDM secure.) This yields the rst encryption scheme that provides soundness under a standard computational assumption.
20 Some subsequent soundness results (e.g., [4, 24] ) consider an active adversary and require IND-CCA security. We stress that does not change the technical complications regarding key-cyclic expressions.
Relation to circular security and extensibility. The following denition is adopted from [17] .
Denition 6 (Cryptographic games). A cryptographic game is a (possibly inecient) random system Γ , where on security parameter k, Γ interacts with an attacker A and may output 1. We dene the game value of such an interaction, denoted Γ A (1 k ), as the probability that Γ outputs 1 in the end of the interaction with A, where the probability is taken over the random coins of Γ and A. A cryptographic game is non-interactive if it consists of two messages, from Γ to A and back.
Examples:
OWF. The security of a one-way function f is equivalent to requiring that the value of the following game is negligible for any ecient A. On security parameter k, the system Γ selects a random x ∈ {0, 1} k and sends y = f (x)
to the adversary. Γ outputs 1 if A outputs x ∈ f −1 (y).
DDH. The security of the DDH hardness assumption is equivalent to requiring that the value of the following game is at most negligibly bounded from 1 2
for any ecient adversary. Let G be an appropriate DDH group (e.g., Z * p for some prime p) and let g be a generator in the group. The system Γ chooses a random bit b, sends the tuple (g x , g y , g z ) to the challenger A, where x and y are random exponents, and z = x · y if b = 0 and a random value otherwise. Γ outputs 1 i A has guessed b correctly.
(Enc, Dec) has a δ-strongly-black-box reduction from its KDM security to a cryptographic game Γ with respect to a family of query function Q, if there exists an oracle-aided algorithm R with the following guarantee: Let A be an ecient adversary that breaks the KDM security of the scheme using query functions from Q with advantage A = A (k) (i.e., On security parameter k, A distinguishes between encryptions of functions of the secret key and encryptions of garbage with advantage A (k)). Then the value of Γ R A (1 k ) ≥ δ(k, A (k)). Here, we require that R treat the query functions it gets from A as black boxes all it can do is to query them on arbitrary chosen inputs.
Informally, we say that a proof for the KDM security of a scheme is stronglyblack-box with respect to a game Γ and a family of query function Q, if the value of δ(k, A (k)) for every non-negligible A (k) is considered a break of Γ (i.e., δ(k, A (k)) > Theorem 10. Let (Enc, Dec) be a δ-strongly-black-box reduction from its KDM security to a non-interactive cryptographic game Γ with respect to a family of query functions Q = {Q k }. 21 Assume that Q k contains the family of functions G k = {g k (x) = f (x, 0 t(k)−k ) ⊕ r : f ∈ F t(k) , r ∈ {0, 1} (k) }, where t(k) ≥ 2k and F t(k) = {f : {0, 1} t(k) → {0, 1} (k) } is an α-exponential hard PRF with t(k) α ≥ 2k. Then, there exists an ecient algorithm A with Γ A ≥ δ(k, 1 − 2 −k ) − 2 −k .
In particular, giving such a strongly-black-box reduction implies that either the class of query function considered is weak (does not contain exponentially hard PRF), or the game Γ can be eciently broken with probability δ(k, 1−2
Proof (sketch) The proof is similar to the proof of [17, Theorem 5] . Consider the following (inecient) adversary A for breaking the KDM security of (Enc, Dec) with respect to Q. On security parameter k, choose a random g ∈ G k and make a KDM query to obtain a ciphertext C. Then check (via exhaustive search) if there 21 Theorem 10 can be shown to hold also against all natural interactive games (see [17] for details). For the sake of simplicity, however, we choose to focus here on the non-interactive case.
exists sk ∈ {0, 1} k such that Dec sk (C) = g(sk). 
